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THE "GREATER GOOD" ... AT WHAT COST?: HOW NONTHERAPEUTIC SCIENTIFIC STUDIES CAN NOW CREATE VIABLE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS IN MARYlAND AFTER GRIMES v. KENNEDY
KRlEGER INSTITUTE, INC.
It is always with the best intentions that the worst work is done.
- Oscar Wilde l
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nontherapeutic research on human subjects generally has been
viewed as necessary to the evolution of modern medicine. 2 How else,
for example, could preventative vaccines prove effective, other than
by injecting a healthy human subject with the vaccine and then testing
the subject's response to a viral or bacterial stimuli?3 Without such
research, our society might still suffer from the ravages of diseases
such as polio and smallpox. Once dreaded afflictions, these diseases
now seem like a thing of the past.
But while history has demonstrated that non therapeutic research is
capable of achieving positive results, history has also shown us how
such research can be the basis for some of the most despicable acts
ever committed in the name of science. 4 One need only to look at
such instances as Nazi experimentation and the Tuskegee Syphilis
Studies5 to understand how easily non therapeutic research can be
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE WRITINGS OF OSCAR WILDE: INTENTIONS Vol. 6, 222 (AR.
Keller & Co. 1907).
.
2. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366 Md. 29, 37 n.2, 782 A2d 807,
812 n.2 (2001). The court stated that "[nJontherapeutic research generally
utilizes subjects who are not known to have the condition the objectives of
the research are designed to address, and/or is not designed to directly
benefit the subjects utilized in the research, but, rather, is designed to
achieve beneficial results for the public at large." Id. See also George J. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 17 (1991); Teresa K Baumann, Proxy Consent and
a National DNA Databank: An Unethical and Discriminatory Combination, 86
IOWA L. REv. 667, 693-94 (2001).
3. See T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 626 N'y.S.2d 1015, 1016
(1995) (noting that "[iJn recent years, researchers have made amazing advances in psychotropic drugs, neurobiology, genetic studies, and the like,
with the promise of more to come by way of prophylactic intervention. Not
all experiments can be restricted to laboratory animals.") Id. at 1016.
4. See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
5. See THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 220 n.35 (George J. Annas & Michael A Grodin
eds., 1992). During the infamous Tuskegee study, poor black men with
syphilis were followed for decades so that the natural course of the disease
could be studied. The research subjects were told only that they had "bad
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abused and twisted to meet the unethical needs of researchers. It is,
therefore, important to recognize that non therapeutic research on
human subjects requires the utmost in regulation and standards. To
require less would no doubt invite abuse akin to the horrors of the
past.
With this in mind, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently decided the case of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. 6 In a unanimous decision, the court severely limited the ability of researchers to
pursue non therapeutic research by recognizing that a "duty of care"
may now exist between medical researchers and their subjects, and
that a breach of this duty may lead to negligence under Maryland
law. 7
This Comment examines the court's reasoning in Grimes by exploring the different theories regarding nontherapeutic consent that
arose after World War II, and commends the court for its deference to
the principles established in the Nuremberg Code. Part II of this
Comment addresses the numerous guidelines that have been promulgated, discussing how they have or have not been adopted in federal
and state courts. 8 Part III analyzes the court's holding, which established a "duty of care" between nontherapeutic researchers and their
research subjects. 9 Furthermore, Part III examines the court's reliance upon other jurisdictions for guidance, as this was a novel issue
for the court. IO Part IV examines the innate problem with children
and informed consent. l l Part V explores the numerous problems involved with research oversight by Institutional Review Boards (hereinafter IRBs) .12 Part VI illustrates the inherent conflict between
commercial research and proper consent. I3 Finally, Part VII discusses
why the court's deference to the principles of the Nuremberg Code,
in the absence of a position by the Maryland legislature, best helps to

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

blood," and were never informed of their diagnosis or purpose of the study
even after penicillin was discovered. Id.
366 Md. 29, 782 A.2d 807 (2001).
Id. at 113, 782 A.2d at 858. The court stated that to establish a claim for
negligence under Maryland law, a party must prove four elements: "(1) that
the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that
the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the
defendant's breach of the duty." Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md.
58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994)) (footnote omitted); see also Brown v.
Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 356, 744 A.2d 47, 54 (2000); Faya v. Almaraz, 329
Md. 435, 448, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1993); Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236,
241,492 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1985).
See infra notes 15-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 83-110 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111-148 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 149-163 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
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protect the individual rights and dignities of nontherapeutic research
subjects. 14

II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Pre-World War II

Whereas now a distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic
research is commonly recognized, United States courts prior to World
War II made no such distinction. 15 This lack of distinction within our
judicial system is quite understandable when one considers that at the
time many researchers believed that such a distinction served no purpose.1 6 While there undoubtedly have been experiments throughout
human history that fall into these separate categories, until World War
II, "the distinction between therapeutic and non therapeutic research
did not playa major part in discussions of what research was permissible."17 Researchers were not ignorant to this distinction, however.
Hippocrates himself described a decidedly non therapeutic experiment he performed on a man with a fractured skul1. 18 While removing fragments of bone from the fracture, the injured man's brain was
stroked so as to observe the. convulsive movements on the opposite
side of his body.19
Surprisingly, even with such an early documentation of a nontherapeutic experiment, it was only in the aftermath of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, when the utter depravity of the Nazi experiments
became known to the world, that a concerted effort was made to explain the boundaries of proper nontherapeutic experimentation. 20
What resulted became known as the Nuremberg Code. 21

B.

Post-World War II' The Nuremberg Code
The Nuremberg Code 22 (hereinafter Code) evolved as a result of
the atrocities performed in the name of science during the Holo14. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
15. See Annas, supra note 2, at 22.
16. See MEDICAL RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN: ETHICS, LAw, AND PRACTICE 27
(Richard H. Nicholson ed., 1986).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The Doctors' Trial, which was part of the post-World War II Nuremberg
trials, questioned the permissible limits of human experimentation and
provided the occasion for a substantive analysis of ethical standards. See Annas, supra note 5, at 3-4.
21. Annas, supra note 5, at 3-4.
22. See Annas, supra note 5, at 2. Pertinent parts of the Nuremberg Code read
as follows:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have the
legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be
able to exercise free power of choice, without the interven-
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caust. 23 As it stands, the Nuremberg Code is widely considered to be
the "most complete and authoritative statement of the law of in-

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

tion of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter
element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative
decision by the experimental subject there should be made
known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and
the effects upon his health or person which may possibly
come from his participation in the experiment. The duty and
responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the
experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which
may not be delegated to another with impunity.
The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for
the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means
of study, and not random or unnecessary in nature.
The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that
the anticipated results will justify the performance of the
experiment.
The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.
No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori
reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental
physicians also serve as subjects.
The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to
be solved by the experiment.
Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities
provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically
qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care
should be required through all stages of the experiment on
those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
During the course of the experiment the human subject
should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he
has reached the physical or mental state where continuation
of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge
must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if
he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good
faith, superior skill, and careful judgment required of him,
that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.

Id.
23. Annas, supra note 2, at 19-21. For insight into the depravity of the Nazi
experiments, one need only to examine the records of their typhus experiments. Nazi concentration camp prisoners were first injected with various
experimental vaccines against typhus, and then, several weeks later, with
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formed consent to human experimentation," requiring that the "informed, voluntary, competent, and understanding consent of the
research subject be obtained."24 The Code, in significant part, "was
the result of legal thought and legal principles, as opposed to medical
and scientific principles, and thus should be the preferred standard
for assessing the legality of scientific research on human subjects."25
It is generally regarded as the most authoritative legal and ethical document governing international research standards, as well as one of
the premier human rights documents in world history.26 The Code
itself "demonstrates a remarkable suspicion of research with human
subjects and those who perform such research."27
Looking at the factual background of the Code, it would appear
that the Code is directed at regulating non therapeutic research. 28 After all, the Code was promulgated in response to horrific acts of needless experimentation that offered research subjects no possible direct
benefit. 29 Thus, it appears that the Code was originally designed to
"regulate pure research, which is designed to provide new knowledge
but is in no way intended to benefit the subject."3o
Medical researchers found the Code to be unduly constrictive to
their practice because "(1) it was promulgated as a human rights document by judges at a criminal trial and (2) the judges made no attempt to deal with clinical research on children, healthy volunteers,
patients, or mentally-impaired people."31 Supporters of the Nuremberg Code have rebutted the attack by stating that "[t]he answer to
the first concern is that the Code is universal; the response to the
second lies in an interpretation of the Code, rather than in its abandonment. A reasonable analogy is the way we interpret the United
States Constitution to apply to changes in technology."32
But one must realize that no United States court has ever awarded
damages to an injured experimental subject, or punished an experimenter, because the experimenter violated the Code. 33 In fact, the
first United States court decision to cite the Nuremberg Code was decided in 1973, more than twenty-five years after announcement of the

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

blood from a patient with typhus. Within days nearly all of the test subjects
were dead. See MEDICAL RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN, supra note 16, at 28.
Annas, supra note 2, at 21.
Grimes v. Kennedy Kreiger Inst. Inc., 366 Md. 29, 74, 782 A.2d 807,835 (2001).
George J. Annas, Questing far Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in
Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 297, 301
(1996) .
Leonard H. Glantz, Law, Medicine and Socially Responsible Research: Research
with Children, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 214 (1998).
See Annas, supra note 5, at 185.
.
Id.
Id.
Annas, supra note 5, at 303.
Id.
See Annas, supra note 2, at 24.
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Code. 34 One reason for this may be due to American society itself and
its emphasis on progress. 35 While the United States has "consistently
argued in [its] ethical codes that the rights and welfare of research
subjects must be protected; on the other hand, [it has] consistently
used perceived emergencies, both national and medical, as an excuse
to jettison individual rights and welfare in human experimentation."36
Such an understanding of utilitarianism, when applied to an individual's rights regarding medical research, can quickly lead to abuse if
it is believed that risks need to be taken for the "greater good" of
society:
This may explain why our own use of prisoners, the institutionalized retarded, and the mentally ill to test malaria treatments during World War II was generally hailed as positive,
making the war 'everyone's war.' Likewise, in the late 1940's
and early 1950's, the testing of new polio vaccines on institutionalized mentally retarded children was considered
appropriate. 37
Americans found the Nazi experiments to be of such an abominable nature that they thought nothing similar could happen within the
United States. 38 What Americans failed to realize, however, is the
blinding effect that the pursuit of the "greater good" can inflict on
researchers. 39 In the nontherapeutic realm of experimentation, a researcher may often "be more concerned with advancing the state of
medical knowledge - and perhaps gaining fame - than with his patient's recovery."40 One need only to look at the misguided aspirations of researchers in what is popularly known as the 'Jewish Hospital
Study" that was conducted in 1963. 41 Following from that egregious
34. Id. (opining that "[t]his is striking because all of the judges at the Doctors'
Trial were Americans, the prosecutors were American, the procedural rules
followed were American, and the case itself was brought under the authority of the Military Governor of the American Zone."); Kaimowitz v. Mich.
Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73 Civ. 19434 AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., July 10,
1973) (unreported), reprinted in ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAw, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902,916 (1974) (holding that an involuntary detained mental patient cannot give informed consent to experimental
procedures) .
35. Annas, supra note 2, at 17.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 24.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Robert D. Mulford, Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN.
L. REv. 99, 100 (1967).
40. Id. at 105.
41. See id. at 99. Two doctors injected live cancer cells into 22 debilitated patients at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital of Brooklyn without the patients' voluntary and informed consent. Id. The experiment was part of a
project aimed at discovering ways to build up immunities against cancer.
Id. It was designed to test the hypothesis that bodies racked by serious, but
non-cancerous, diseases would reject the cancerous cells as swiftly as
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example, it is quite probable that "an investigator who is eager to confirm some hypothesis might, in informing the subject, minimize, either consciously or unconsciously, experimental risks and
uncertainties."42 As is often quoted, "[t]he road to Hell is paved with
good intentions."43
C.

The Declaration of Helsinki

In 1964, the World Medical Association created its own code of ethics for research: the Declaration of Helsinki. 44 Promulgated by members of the medical profession, as opposed to the lawyers and judges
who fashioned the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki
sought to displace the Code, or at least provide a reasonable alternative to its strict confines. 45
Amended three times since its inception,46 the Declaration's objective is to replace the human rights-based agenda of the Nuremberg
Code with a more lenient medical ethics mode1. 47 Unlike the Nuremberg Code, however, the Declaration of Helsinki has never been formally adopted by any court in the United States. 48

42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.

healthy bodies. Id. The experiment confirmed the doctors' hypothesis.
Id.; see also Zeleznik v.Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 366 N'y.S.2d 163 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1975); Application of Hyman, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1964), rev'd sub nom, Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 251 NY.S.2d
818 (NY. App. Div. 1964),206 N.E.2d 338, 397 (N.Y. 1965).
Mulford, supra note 39, at 106.
This proverbial phrase originates from the late 16th century and is often
incorrectly attributed to Samuel Johnson. See The Phrase Finder, available
at http://www.samueljohnson.com/road.html.
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366 Md. 29, 99-100, 782 A.2d 807,
849-50 (2001). The Declaration states:
Non-therapeutic biomedical research involving human subjects
(Non-clinical biomedical research)
1. In the purely scientific application of medical research carried out on a
human being, it is the duty of the physician to remain the protector of
the life and the health of that person on whom biomedical research is
being carried out.
2. The subjects should be volunteers - either healthy persons or
patients for whom the experimental design is not related to the
patient's illness.
3. The investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the
research if in his/her or their judgment it may, if continued, be harmful
to the individual.
4. In research on man, the interest of science and society should never take
precedence over considerations related to the well being of the subject.
Id. at 99-100, 782 A.2d at 850.
See id. at 99 n.39, 782 A.2d at 849 n.39.
Id. at 100, 782 A.2d at 850.
Annas, supra note 2, at 26.
Grimes, 366 Md. at 99 n.39, 782 A.2d at 849 n.39.
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Federal Regulations for Human Research

While the Nuremberg Code has never been considered controlling
law in any United States court decision, federal regulations have been
enacted imposing standards of care that attach to federally funded or
sponsored research projects that use human subjects. 49 Title 45, section 46.101 (a) of the Code of Federal Regulations states that:
[t]his policy applies to all research involving human subjects
conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by
any federal department or agency which takes appropriate
administrative action to make the policy applicable to such
research. This includes research conducted by federal civilian employees or military personnel, except that each department or agency may adopt such procedural modification
as may be appropriate from an administrative standpoint. It
also includes research conducted, supported, or otherwise
subject to regulation by the federal government outside the
United States. 50
The federal regulations detailing the proper standard of care that
medical researchers must adopt in regard to human subjects also outlines the general requirements for proper informed consent in such
studies. 51 In exhaustive detail, section 46.116(a) of Title 45 of the
Code of Federal Regulations provides eight provisions that must be
followed to secure the most rudimentary informed consent. 52 Addi49. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2001).
50. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2001).
51. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2001) (stating that "[e]xcept as provided elsewhere
in this policy, no investigator may involve a human being as a subject in
research covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally ejjective informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally authorized
representative.") (emphasis added).
52. See id. § 46.116(a). This regulation provides that, in seeking informed consent, the following information shall be provided to each subject:
(1) A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of
the purposes of the research and the expected duration of the
subject's participation, a description of the procedures to be
followed, and identification of any procedures which are
experimental;
(2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject;
(3) A description of any benefits to the subject or to others which
may reasonably be expected from the research;
(4) A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses
of treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject;
(5) A statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records identirying the subject will be maintained;
(6) For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation
as to whether any compensation and an explanation as to
whether any medical treatments are available if i~ufy occurs,
and, if so, what they consist of, or where further information
may be obtained;
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tional safeguards are also provided that relate to unforeseen risks that
become manifest during the course of the research. 53
Mter close scrutiny, one realizes that the federal regulations have
much in common with the Nuremberg Code. An absolute requirement of informed consent to nontherapeutic experiments clearly appears in both. 54 But unlike the Nuremberg Code, which set forth
rules that applied to researchers, the federal regulations were directed
at the institution that received research funds. 55 Previous regulations
specifically state that "safeguarding the rights and welfare of subjects
at risk ... is primarily the responsibility of the institution which receives
or is accountable to DHEW [Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare] for the funds awarded for the support of the activity."56

III.

ANALYSIS

Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc. 57 arose out of a study performed
under the auspices of the prestigious Kennedy Krieger Institute, an
institute associated with Johns Hopkins University. 58 Nontherapeutic
in nature, the study was created to test the effectiveness of lead paint
abatement procedures in homes, 59 procedures that could be costly.60
The court stated that" [t] he ultimate aim of the research was to find a
less than complete level of abatement that would be relatively safe, but
(7) An explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent
questions about the research and research subjects' rights, and
whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury to the
subject; and
(8) A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the
subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to
which the subject is otherwise entitled.
[d.
53. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(5) (stating, when appropriate, the research subject shall be provided with "[aJ statement that significant new findings developed during the course of the research which may relate to the subject's
willingness to continue participation ... ").
54. 45 C.F.R, § 46.116; see also Annas, supra note 5, at 227.
55. See Annas, supra note 5, at 187.
56. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(a) (1975) (emphasis added).
57. 366 Md. 29, 782 A.2d 807 (2001).
58. Grimes, 366 Md. at 36, 782 A.2d at 811-12.
59. The study considered five test groups, each consisting of twenty-five houses.
[d. at 50, 782 A.2d at 820. Three of the groups consisted of houses with a
significant amount of lead dust present, each of these groups receiving assigned amounts of abatement procedures. [d. at 50-51, 782 A.2d at 820. A
fourth group was made up of houses that at one time had lead present in
the form of lead-based paint but had since received a supposedly complete
abatement of lead dust. [d. at 51, 782 A.2d at 820. The fifth and final
group consisted of modern houses that had never had the presence of lead
dust. [d.
60. Grimes, 366 Md. at 48, 782 A.2d at 819.
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economical, so that Baltimore landlords with lower socio-economical
rental units would not abandon the units."61
The Kennedy Krieger Institute encouraged the landlords of these
homes to "rent the premises to families with young children."62 Children were particularly desired to participate in the study because they
tend to have a greater susceptibility to ingesting lead paint, thereby
providing the researchers with clearer results as to the effectiveness of
the abatement procedures. 63 The court stated that "[i]t [could] be
argued that the researchers intended that the children be the canaries
in the mines but never clearly told the parents."64

A.

The Duty Between Researchers and Their Subjects

In Grimes, the court held that "special relationships, out of which
duties arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence, can result
from the relationships between researcher and research subjects."65
This holding, however, was not evidenced by Maryland statutes or case
law. 66 In fact, the holding by the court came out of "the absence of
the exercise of legislative policymaking,"67 thereby becoming what
some might term as 'Judicial legislation." Presumably to preemptively
rebut such an accusation, the court stated that "[t]he determination
of whether a duty exists under Maryland law is the ultimate function
of various policy considerations as adopted by either the Legislature,
61. [d. at 51, 782 A.2d at 821. The court stated that:
It appears that this study was also partially motivated ... by the
reaction of property owners in Baltimore City to the cost of lead
dust abatement. The cost of full abatement of such housing at
times far exceeded the monetary worth of the property - in other
words, the cost of full abatement was simply too high for certain
landlords to be able to afford to payor be willing to pay.
[d. at 51-52, 782 A.2d at 821.
62. [d. at 36-37, 782 A.2d at 812.
63. [d. at 38, 782 A.2d at 812-13 (stating that " [a]pparently, it was anticipated
that the children, who were the human subjects in the program, would, or
at least might, accumulate lead in their blood from the dust, thus helping
the researchers to determine the extent to which the various partial abatement methods worked."). [d. at 38, 782 A.2d at 812-13.
64. [d. at 38, 782 A.2d at 813 (explaining that "[i]t was a practice in earlier
years ... for subsurface miners to rely on canaries to determine whether
dangerous levels of toxic gasses were accumulating in the mines ... When
the canaries began to die, the miners knew that dangerous levels of gasses
were accumulating."). [d.
65. [d. at 94, 782 A.2d at 846.
66. See Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 145-50, 753 A.2d 41, 65-68 (2000)
(noting varying concepts for what constitutes a special relationship); Holsen v. State, 99 Md. App. 411, 415-22, 637 A.2d 871, 872-76 (1994) (defining special relationships, but looking to other jurisdictions for guidance);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 315 (1965) (listing examples of relationships that create a special duty).
67. Grimes, 366 Md. at 93-94, 782 A.2d at 846.
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or, if it has not spoken, as it has not in respect to this situation, by ,
Maryland courts."68
l.

Creating a "Duty" Under Maryland Law

Under Maryland law, parties can establish claims of negligence by
proving four elements. 69 The elements include: "(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the
defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual
injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from
the defendant's breach of the duty."70
At the trial level, the circuit court granted two summary judgment
motions for Kennedy Krieger. 71 The court's decision was based solely
on the grounds that there was no legal duty to protect the children. 72
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals was primarily concerned
with resolving the first element of negligence: whether the Kennedy
Krieger Institute was under a duty to protect the children from injury.73 It was essential that the court begin its analysis at this step,
because "there can be no negligence where there is no duty that is
due; for negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes
to another."74
"Duty" in negligence has been defined as "an obligation, to which
the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular
standard of conduct toward another."75 There is no clear-cut way of
determining whether a duty exists, but there are a number of variables
to consider. 76 As the court of appeals stated in its decision in Faya v.
Almaraz,77, "legal scholars have long agreed that the seriousness of po68. Id. at 100, 782 A.2d at 850.
69. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
70. Grimes, 366 Md. At 85, 782 A.2d at 841 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335
Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. W.Va. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Fuller, 96 Md. 652, 666, 54 A. 669, 671 (1903).
75. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 53 (W. Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).
76. See Tarasoffv. Regents ofUniv. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (1976). The
court stated that important factors to consider include:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id.; see also Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); Merrill v. Buck, 375
P.2d 304, 310 (1962).
77. 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).
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tential harm, as well as its probability, contributes to a duty to prevent
it.,,78 Certainly the act of exposing children to the dangers of lead
contamination weighed heavily in favor of the court determining that
a duty existed between the Kennedy Krieger Institute and the children
participating in the research study,19
Upon recognizing that a duty existed between the Kennedy Krieger
Institute and the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals of Maryland looked
for guidance in deciding what this duty should entai1. 80 The court was
not completely in uncharted territory when determining what duties
researchers owed their subjects. 81 To help guide its decision, the
court looked to an analogous case, Whitlock v. Duke University.82

2.

The Whitlock "Foreseeability" Precedent

Whitlock involved a research subject who suffered organic brain
damage from decompression experiments. 83 The plaintiff was an experienced diver who signed up to participate in the study in the hope
that it would further his career. 84 After signing the consent form,
which informed him of the dangerous risks associated with compression and decompression experimentation, the plaintiff began to participate in the research dives. 85 Following a dive that went to a
simulated depth of 2250 feet, the plaintiff began experiencing
problems that he attributed to his involvement in the research study.86
After alleging that the dives resulted in permanent organic brain damage, the plaintiff filed suit against the research institution. 87
The plaintiff in Whitlock based one of his claims on a negligence
theory, namely that the researchers controlling the study negligently
780 Id. at 449, 620 A.2d at 333; see also Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 714-15, 697
A.2d 1371, 1375-76 (1997) (stating that "[t]wo of the relevant factors to
consider in determining whether such a duty should be recognized are 'the
nature of the harm likely to result from a failure to exercise due care, and
the relationship that exists between the parties.''') (citing Jacques v. First
Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 534, 515 A.2d 756, 759) (1986)).
79. See Grimes, 366 Md. at 49,782 A.2d at 819 ("Lead poisoning poses a distinct
danger to young children. It adversely effects cognitive development,
growth, and behavior. Extremely high levels have been known to result in
seizures, coma, and even death.").
80. Grimes, 366 Md. at 97-98, 782 A.2d at 848-49.
81. See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
82. 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D.N.C. 1986), affd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987).
83. Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. at 1465-66 (noting that the experiment consisted of
four simulated deep dives for the purpose of researching high-pressure nervous syndrome).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1465-66 ("The informed consent form advised that the risks associated with compression were of possible lung collapse, production of fluid,
hearing loss, inflammation of the ear, and sinusitis. Regarding the risks
associated with decompression the form advised of the risk of decompression sickness including death, disability, and joint pain.").
86. Id.
87. Id.
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failed to inform him of the risk of organic brain damage as a result of
the dives. 88 The court began its analysis by stating that "plaintiffs'
claim for negligence must succeed, if at all, on the theory that Dr.
Bennett should have warned him of the danger of organic brain damage."89 At trial, the first issue was determining what duty a researcher
owes, to a subject in a nontherapeutic experimental context. 90 Much
like the court of appeals in Grimes, the federal district court in Whitlock
gave deference to both the Nuremberg Code91 and Title 45 section 46
of the Code of Federal Regulations. 92 The court concluded that the
degree of required disclosure of risks regarding non therapeutic research is higher than that in the non-experimental therapeutic context and, therefore, declined to apply the same standard in each
situation. 93 Instead, the court found that 45 C.F.R. section
46.116(a)(2)(1985)94 should provide the proper guidance in negligence claims involving nontherapeutic research. 95 The court explicitly recognized that a "reasonably foreseeable" standard should apply
when analyzing negligence claims in the nontherapeutic context. 96
Applying this "reasonably foreseeable" standard to the facts, the
court found that the researchers had a duty to inform Mr. Whitlock of
all the risks that were reasonably foreseeable. 97 The issue then became "whether a risk of brain damage different from that normally
associated with decompression and unique to experimental deep diving was a reasonably foreseeable risk . . . ."98 In applying this principle, however, the court found that Whitlock failed to provide any
evidence that there was a foreseeable or known risk associated with
the deep diving research. 99 Therefore, it could not be concluded that
organic brain damage was a reasonably foreseeable risk that the researchers were required to disclose.IOo Finding no issue of fact as to
whether the risk of organic brain damage as a result of the dives was a
reasonably foreseeable risk, the court granted summary judgment to
the defendants on the negligence issue.IO I
88. Id. at 1469.
89. Id. at 1470 (stating further that "[t]his follows because the general danger
of organic brain damage associated with decompression was known to Mr.
Whitlock as he admitted; and the informed consent form made it clear to
Mr. Whitlock that the dangers associated with decompression could not
always be avoided by treatment.").
90. Id.
91. See Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. at 1470.
92. See id. at 1471.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
95. Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. at 1471.
96. Id. at 1471 n.9.
97. Id. at 1472.
.
9B. Id.
99. Id.
100. Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. at 1472.
101. Id.
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Distinguishing Grimes from Whitlock

The court of appeals in Grimes was quick to point out in its analysis
that, unlike the dangers that befell the plaintiff in Whitlock, the risks
associated with the lead paint exposure were clearly foreseeable and
well known to the researchers. 102 The court found the two cases
"clearly distinguishable"lo3 since "the risks associated with exposing
children to lead-based paint were not only foreseeable, but were well
known by [Kennedy Krieger Institute] ."104 The point was made even
more lucid when the court explained that "it had to have been reasonably foreseeable by [Kennedy Krieger Institute] that the children's
blood might be contaminated by lead because the extent of contamination of the blood of the children would ... be used to measure the
effectiveness of the various abatement methods."105 The court found
it particularly egregious that the consent forms to the research did not
directly inform the parents of the children studied that some level of
lead, a decidedly harmful substance, could contaminate their children's blood.106
102. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366 Md. 29, 98, 782. A.2d 807, 849
(2001) .
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The Kennedy Krieger Institute Consent Form states in relevant part:
PURPOSE OF STUDY:
As you may know, lead poisoning in children is a problem in Baltimore City and other communities across the country. Lead in
paint, house dust and outside soil are major sources of lead exposure for children. Children can also be exposed to lead in drinking
water and other sources. We understand that your house is going
to have special repairs done in order to reduce exposure to lead in
paint and dust. On a random basis, homes will receive one of two
levels of repair. We are interested in finding out how well the two
levels of repair work. The repairs are not intended, or expected, to
completely remove exposure to lead.
We are now doing a study to learn about how well different practices work for reducing exposure to lead in paint and dust. We are
asking you and over one hundred other families to allow us to test
for lead in and around your homes up to 8 to 9 times over the next
two years provided that your house qualifies for the full two years of
study. Final eligibility will be determined after the initial testing of
your home. We are also doing free blood lead testing of children
aged 6 months to 7 years, up to 8 to 9 times over the next two years.
We would also like you to respond to a short questionnaire every 6
months. This study is intended to monitor the effects of the repairs and is not intended to replace the regular medical care your
family obtains.
BENEFITS:
To compensate you for your time answering questions and allowing
us to sketch your home we will mail you a check in the amount of
$5.00. In the future we would mail you a check in the amount of
$15 each time the questionnaire is completed. The dust, soil,
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Guidance from the Federal Regulations

Also in accordance with the Whitlock court, the court of appeals
found guidance in the federal regulations regarding what duty of informed consent is owed to a non therapeutic research subject. 107 The
court found it "clear from the wording of the applicable federal regulations that this requirement of informed consent continues during
the duration of the research study and applies to new or changing
risks."108 Therefore, in Maryland, it will generally be expected of researchers in the non therapeutic setting to promptly tell their human
subjects, before consent is given, all of the risks of the research that
are reasonably foreseeable. 109 The court recognized that a duty of
care can be created in the researcher-subject relationship, and that
the duty owed can be breached if proper informed consent is not
given, thereby giving rise to a viable negligence claim under Maryland
law. 110
IV.

THE DILEMMA OF CHILDREN AND CONSENT IN NONTHERAPEUTIC RESEARCH

Of special significance to the Grimes analysis was that the subjects of
the research were purposely meant to be children. III Because children are considered to be under legal disability, they cannot give
proper informed consent. 11 2 But their parents, acting as representatives, provided the research institute with consent to perform this research on their chiidrenY3 The court of appeals clearly saw the
thorny situation that this case presented. If the court was to accept
the Nuremberg Code's categorical statement that the informed consent of the human subject is "essential" as true, then research on
young children could not be conducted. The court was not willing to

107.
108.
109.
1l0.
lll.
ll2.

ll3.

water, and blood samples would be tested for lead at the Kennedy
Krieger Institute at no charge to you. We would provide you with
specific blood-lead results. We would contact you to discuss a summary of house test results and steps that you could take to reduce
any risks of exposure.
Id. at 57-58, 782 A.2d at 824-25.
See supra Part IJ.D.
Grimes, 366 Md. at 98, 782 A.2d at 849.
Id.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Grimes, 366 Md. at 36-37, 782 A.2d at 812.
See id. at 113, 782 A.2d at 858; see also ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 236 (Urban' & Scwarzenberg 2d ed., 1986). A
major problem concerning proposed research on children is that "children ... lack the legal capacity to consent. In addition, many of them,
particularly the younger ones, are incapable of sufficient comprehension to
meet the high standards of consent to research developed in such documents as the Nuremberg Code." Id.
LEVINE, supra note 112, at 236 (explaining that this kind of consent is commonly referred to as "proxy consent").
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go that far, however, as it is accepted that children have benefited
enormously from the biomedical and behavioral knowledge that has
been acquired through properly conducted research. 114 The issue
before the court thus became "[w]hat right does a parent have to
knowingly expose a child not in need of therapy to health risks or
otherwise knowingly place a child in danger, even if it can be argued it
is for the greater goOd?"115 Realizing that this question was fraught
with "profound moral and ethical implications,"1l6 the court once
again looked to prior case law that had wrestled with this dilemma. 117
A.

Strunk v. Strunk

The Kentucky case of Strunk v. Strunk 1l8 did not concern substituted
consent for a child, but rather, substituted consent for an incompetent twenty-seven year old adult. 1l9 The incompetent adult, Jerry
Strunk, had an ailing brother desperately in need of a kidney transplant. 120 This brother, Tommy Strunk, was being kept alive through
artificial means that were admittedly only a temporary solution. 121
With his options quickly running out, Tommy Strunk's only chance
for survival was to receive a healthy kidney from his incompetent
brother, Jerry.122 Their parents "immediately presented the legal
problem as to what, if anything, could be done by the family, especially the mother and the father to procure a transplant from Jerry to
Tommy."123 Both the county court and the circuit court gave their
approval for the procedure. 124 Jerry Strunk himself was represented
throughout the proceedings by a guardian ad litem, "who ... continually questioned the power of the state to authorize the removal of an
organ from the body of an incompetent who is a ward of the state."125
The appeals court acknowledged that it was "fully cognizant of the
fact that the question before us is unique. Insofar as we have been
able to learn, no similar set of facts has come before the highest court
of any of the states of this nation or the federal courts."126 The Court
of Appeals of Kentucky did recognize that" [w] here legal disability of
114. SeeTHE NAZI DOcrORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 5, at 192.
115. Grimes, 366 Md. 104, 782 A.2d at 852.
116. Id. at 104, 782 A.2d at 852.
117. Id. at 105-11, 782 A.2d at 853-56.
lIS. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
119. See id. at 146 ('1erry Strunk is 27 years of age, incompetent, and through
proper legal proceedings has been committed to ... a state institution
maintained for the feebleminded. He has an I.Q. of approximately 35,
which corresponds with the mental age of approximately six years.").
120. Id. at 145.
12l. See id.
122. Id. at 146.
123. Id.
124. Strunk, .445 S.W.2d at 147 (Steinfeld, j., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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the individual is shown, the jurisdiction of the court is plenary and
potent to afford whatever relief may be necessary to protect his interests and preserve his estates."127 Applying this principle to the case
before it, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky found that the lower court
did have the proper authority to authorize the kidney transplant of
Jerry to his brother, even though Jerry was under legal disability.I28
In a rather sharp dissent by Judge Steinfeld from the Kentucky
court's holding, he expressed the same concern that would later resurface in the majority opinion in Grimes. I29 Especially relevant to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision was Judge Steinfeld's acknowledgment of the Supreme Court case of Prince v. Massachusetts. I3o
In Prince, the Supreme Court opined that "[p]arents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs out of their children before
they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves."I3I Therefore, according to Judge
Steinfeld's dissent, parents should not have legal authority to substitute their consent for that of their children in instances dealing with a
child's bodily integrity.132
B.

Hart v. Brown

A similar legal question arose in the case of Hart v. Brown. I33 The
only real difference being that in Hart the legal disability was due to
the fact that the prospective donee was a child, not a mental incompetent. 134 The court in Hart upheld the giving of consent by the child's
parents, but only after discussing the extensive process that the parties
and the court had undertaken. 135 The court noted that:
127. [d. (quoting 27 AM. JUR. 20 Equity§ 69) (currently at 27AAM.JuR. 20 Equity
§ 63 (2002».
128. [d. at 149.
129. [d. (Steinfeld, J., dissenting) ("Apparently because of my indelible recollection of a government which, to tl1e everlasting shame of its citizens, embarked on a program of genocide and experimentation witl1 human bodies
I have been more troubled in reaching a decision in tl1is case tl1an in any
other.").
130. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
131. Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
132. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 151 (Steinfeld, j., dissenting); see also Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (App. D.C. 1941) (holding that a fifteen-year-old's consent in removing of a skin patch for the benefit of another was legally
ineffective) .
133. 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
134. [d. at 390.
135. See id. (explaining that an "investigation of [tl1e parents'] motivation and
reasoning ... has been accomplished in this matter by the participation of
a clergyman, the defendant physicians, an attorney guardian ad litem [sic]
for the donor, the guardian ad litem [sic] for the donee, and, indeed, this
court itself.").
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[I] t would appear that the natural parents would be able to
substitute their consent for that of their minor children after
a close, independent and objective investigation of their motivation and reasoning. . .. There is authority in our American jurisdiction that nontherapeutic operations can be
legally permitted on a minor as long as the parents or other
guardians consent to the procedure. 136
The Court of Appeals of Maryland sought to differentiate the Strunk
and Hart cases from the case before it by explaining that there were
no safeguarding processes that occurred before the research began
on the children in Grimes, a far cry from the protective measures discussed in Strunk and Hart. 137 The court made it clear that "[w]hat is
of primary importance to be gleaned in the Hart and Strunk cases is
not that the parents or guardians consented to the procedures, but
that they first sought permission of the courts, and received that permission, before consenting to a nontherapeutic procedure."138 The
court broadened the sweep of the Grimes decision even further when it
stated that "in non therapeutic research using children, we hold that
consent of a parent alone cannot make appropriate that which is innately inappropriate."139
C.

T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health

The case that found the most favor with the court of appeals was the
New York case of T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health. 140 In
that case, one of the issues addressed by the intermediate appellate
court of New York was the reasonableness of accepting parental consent for minors to participate in non therapeutic research that may be
potentially harmful. 141 The court stated:
We also find unacceptable the provisions that allow for consent to be obtained on behalf of minors for participation in
greater than minimal risk 142 non-therapeutic research from
136. [d.
137. Grimes, 366 Md. at 108, 782 A.2d at 854-55.
138. [d. at 108, 782 A.2d at 855 (stating that "[s]cience cannot be permitted to
be the sole judge of the appropriateness of such research methods on
human subjects .... [I]n these contested cases, the research study protocols, those of which we are aware, were not appropriate."). [d. at 108, 782
A.2d at 855.
139. [d. at 109, 782 A.2d at 855.
140. 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
141. [d. at 191-92.
142. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2001) ("Minimal risk means that the probability
and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not
greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life
or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.") (emphasis added); see also LEVINE, supra note 112, at 247
("The Commission provides examples of procedures presenting no more
than minimal risk; these are routine immunization, modest changes in diet
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the minor's parent or legal guardian ... [i]t follows therefore that a parent or guardian ... may not consent to have a
child submit to painful and/or potentially life-threatening
research procedures that hold no prospect of benefit for the
child. 143
Following this logic, the Court of Appeals of Maryland explicitly
held in Grimes that, "in Maryland a parent, appropriate relative, or
other applicable surrogate, cannot consent to the participation of a
child or other person under legal disability in nontherapeutic research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or damage to the
health of the subject."144
This holding came under quick attack and was accused of being too
restrictive by numerous groups, including the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association of American Universities, the
Johns Hopkins University (of which the Kennedy Krieger Institute is
an affiliate), and the University of Maryland Medical System Corporation. 145 Their amici curiae brief, requesting a reconsideration of the
court's holding, stated that:
Under the plain terms of the Court's holding, consent to
participate in health research in cases involving children and
others under legal disability is, as a matter of law, unavailable
whenever there is any risk of harm to the participant. The
overall cost of such a rule in terms of lost advantages in medical and health knowledge (and ultimately lost opportunities
to cure disease and prevent suffering and loss of life) will far
outweigh the asserted advantage of protecting individual
rights ... Amici profoundly disagree with this prohibition. A
rule prohibiting 'nontherapeutic research or studies in
which there is any risk of injury' would prohibit virtually all
medical and public health research involving children and
other persons under legal disability.146
On October 11,2001, the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied this
motion for reconsideration of its holding,147 and in doing so clarified

143.
144.
145.

146.

147.

or schedule, physical examination, obtaining blood and urine specimens,
and developmental assessments.").
TD., 650 N'y.S.2d at 191-92.
Grimes, 366 Md. at 113, 782 A.2d at 858.
See Amici Curiae Brief for the Ass'n of Am. Med. Colis., et al. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc, 366 Md. 29, 782 A.2d 807 (2001), available at http:/
/www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/2001/SEPTEMBER/briefs.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2002); see also Loretta M. Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny: Grimes Narrows their Interpretation, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 38, 41 (2002).
Amici Curiae Brief for the Ass'n of Am. Med. Colis. et aI., Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Inst., Inc, 366 Md. 29, 782 A.2d 807 (2001), available at http://www.
hopkinsmedicine.org/press/2001/SEPTEMBER/briefs.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2002).
Grimes, 366 Md. at 119, 782 A.2d at 86l.
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its decision, stating that any risk of injury or damage means any risk
beyond a minimal risk of harm. 148

V.

THE FALSE SECURITY OF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
OVERSIGHT

Another issue not lost upon the court in Grimes was the effectiveness
of Johns Hopkins' Joint Committee on Clinical Investigation in overseeing the propriety of the research. 149 Acting as the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 150 of the study, the joint committee provided for
prior group review of the protocol and risks of proposed research. I51
IRBs have the tendency to be less than completely objective, however,
because "they have a professional identification with the investigator,
owe a common loyalty to their joint institution, and share, at least
indirectly, in the glory (and money) that research brings."I52
The court of appeals met this difficulty head on by stating that
"[ t] he Institutional Review Boards, IRBs, are, primarily, in-house organs. In our view, they are not designed, generally, to be sufficiently
objective in the sense that they are sufficiently concerned 'with the
ethicality of the experiments they review as they are with the success of
the experiments."I53
The court took an especially critical view when the IRB involved
with the lead study, "whose primary function was to insure safety and
compliance with applicable regulations, encouraged the researchers
to misrepresent the purpose of the research in order to bring the
study under the label of 'therapeutic' and thus under a lower safety
standard of regulation."I54 Particularly deserving of suspicion was a
148. Id. at 120, 782 A.2d at 862; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text

(defining minimal risk).
149. See Grimes, 366 Md. at 45, 782 A.2d at 817.

150. Id, at 38-39, 782 A.2d at 813. In explaining IRBs, the court stated:
[they] are oversight entities within the institutional family to which
an entity conducting research belongs. In research experiments,
an IRB can be required in some instances by either federal or state
regulation, or sometimes by the conditions attached to governmental grants that are used to fund research projects. Generally, their
primary functions are to determine whether the project itself is appropriate, whether the consent procedures are adequate, whether
the methods to be employed meet proper standards, whether reporting requirements are sufficient, and the assessment of various
other aspects of a research project. One of the most important
objectives of such review is the review of the potential safety and
health hazard impact of a research project on the human subjects
of the experiment, especially on vulnerable subjects such as children. Their function is not to help researchers seek funding for
research projects.
Id. at 39, 782 A.2d at 813.
151. See id,
152. Mulford, supra note 39, at 109.
153. Grimes, 366 Md. at 45, 782 A.2d at 817.
154. Id. at 46, 782 A.2d at 817.
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letter from the IRB to the lead study's head researcher. l55 The letter
was aimed to circumvent the federal regulations regarding children
and nontherapeutic research. 156 Understandably, the court was not
amused by this correspondence.
The history of IRBs does not, as one might at first think, have a
direct link to the Nuremberg Code. 157 In fact, the Nuremberg Code
makes no mention at all of committee or peer review; all responsibility
for the rights and welfare of research subjects were placed on the individual researchers. l5s The growth of the IRBs took off in the 1950's
and 60's, when the federal government declared that no grants would
be given to institutions in support of their human research projects
unless they had prior peer review. 159 But not all have been so fast to
embrace the acceptance of the IRB as a champion of ethical research
protocols. 160 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Washington
v. Harper 61 , made it clear that he was wary of what amounted to "a
mock trial before an institutionally biased tribunal. ... "162 Johns Hopkins' Joint Committee on Clinical Investigation's dubious actions in
Grimes clearly gave credence to Justice Stevens' opinion.163
VI.

THE INHERENT
RESEARCH

CONFLICT

WITH

COMMERCIAL

One problem, of seemingly gargantuan proportions, to arise out of
non therapeutic research is the almost inevitable conflict between giving fully informed consent and the desire to complete the research
study as planned. In Grimes, the court of appeals stated that legal protections "might additionally be warranted because of the likely conflict
155. See id. at 39-40, 782 A.2d at 813-14.
156. See id. An excerpt from the letter stated:
Federal guidelines are really quite specific regarding using children as controls in projects in which there is no potential benefit
[to the particular children]. To call a subject a normal control is to
indicate that there is no real benefit to be received [by the particular children] . . .. So we think it would be much more acceptable
to indicate that the 'control group' is being studied to determine
what exposure outside the home may play in total lead exposure;
thereby, indicating that these control individuals are gaining some
benefit, namely learning whether safe housing alone is sufficient to
keep the blood-lead levels in acceptable bounds. We suggest that
you modify ... consent form[s] ... accordingly.
Id. at 40, 782 A.2d at 814.·
.
157. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 322
(2d ed, 1986).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 322-23.
160. Id. at 327.
161. 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (involving the use of psychiatric medication on mental
patients without their consent).
162. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Grimes, 366 Md. at 45-46, 782 A.2d at 817.
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of interest between the goal of the research experimenter and the
health of the human subject ... when such research is commercialized."164 It is not difficult to see how a researcher who has put countless time and energy into an experiment will want to see it through its
entirety, especially if there is a financial enticement to the proceedings. If a human research subject was to "withdraw from the research
study prior to its completion, then the results of the study could be
rendered meaningless. There is thus an inherent reason for not conveying information to subjects as it arises, that might cause the subjects to leave the research project."165
The purpose of the research in Grimes, the court concluded, "was to
determine whether there was a less expensive way than full abatement
that would be cost-effective in reducing lead poisoning in children
from a lower economic background. "166 The research itself was inextricably intertwined with the commercial interests of the city of Baltimore, a factor that the court examined with a cautious eye. 167 The
medical profession, which supposedly puts the best interests of patients as its highest priority, cannot let commercial interests unethically taint research proceedings, thereby failing the consent
guidelines expounded in Grimes. 168
VII.

CONCLUSION

The holding of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. has practically allowed viable negligence
claims to arise out of a "special relationship" that exists in nontherapeutic research between researchers and their human subjects. 169 Basically, such a relationship gives rise to a duty of care that, if breached,
would be the basis for an action in negligence. 170 This duty includes
proper informed consent of the reasonable and foreseeable risks of
participation in the nontherapeutic study.171 Whether there is a duty
of care will be decided by the trier of fact on a case-by-case basis. 172
While the acts committed by the Nazis resulting in the Nuremberg
Code did not require the Nuremberg judges to delve into the subtle
nuances of the ethics of human experimentation, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had to address the less obvious issue of non therapeutic research on children. But, by adhering to the basic principles
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 101, 782 A.2d at 850.
at 101, 782 A.2d at 851.
at 103, 782 A.2d at 852.
at 42-43, 782 A.2d 815-16.
See Annas, supra note 2, at 29-30.
Grimes, 366 Md. at 113, 782 A.2d at 858; see supra Part lILA.
Grimes, 366 Md. at 73-74, 782 A.2d at 834; see supra Part lILA.
Grimes, 366 Md. at 75-76 n.31, 782 A.2d at 835-36 n.31 (quoting Annas,
supra note 2); see supra Part lILA.
172. Grimes, 366 Md. at 113-14, 782 A.2d at 858 (relying on Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 150, 753 A.2d 41,68 (2000)).
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of the Nuremberg Code, the court took a commendable step in safeguarding the dignity of all nontherapeutic research subjects, young or
old, mentally handicapped or perfectly cognizant. The court recognized the emphasis that the Nuremberg Code placed upon "the need
to protect the rights of every individual research subject, regardless of
the potential value to society of a research project."173 No researcher
should have the power to dedicate a person's life to the advancement
of science without that person's informed consent.
The court's holding has also effectively forbidden the ability of researchers to use children as subjects in their nontherapeutic research
without prior judicial approval and oversight, if that research may in
any way bear more than a minimal risk to the child. 174 Although strict
in its approach, this aspect of the court's decision undoubtedly best
protects Maryland's children from being subjected to dangerous nontherapeutic experimentation for which their parents might otherwise
substitute consent. As it stands, the broad holding of Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Institute, Inc. has truly put the well-being of human subjects in a
nontherapeutic research setting as the researcher's top priority.
Clifton R Gray

173. MEDICAL RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN: ETHICS, LAw, AND PRACTICE 28 (Richard
H. Nicholson ed., 1986).
174. Grimes, 366 Md. at 113, 782 A.2d at 857-58; see supra Part IV.C.

